Introduction
In the game theory literature, there is an intriguing line of research on the problem of playing a repeated matrix game against an adversary whose computational resources are limited in some way. Perhaps the main way in which this research differs from classical game theory lies in the fact that when our adversary is not playing the minimax optimal strategy for the game, we may be able to attain payoff that is significantly greater than the minimax optimum. In this situation, the correct measure of our performance is in comparison to the optimum achievable against the particular adversary, not to the minimax optimum.
The typical approach is to assume that the adversary's strategy is a member of some natural class of computationally bounded strategies -most often, a class of finite automata.
(For a survey on the area of "bounded rationality", see the paper of Kalai [4] .) Many previous papers examine how various aspects of classical game theory change in this setting; a good example is the question of whether cooperation is a stable solution for prisoner's dilemma when both players are finite automata [6, 81. Some authors have examined the further problem of learning to play optimally against an adversary whose precise strategy is unknown, but is constrained to lie in some known class of strategies (for instance, see Gilboa and Samet [3] ). It is this research that forms our starting point. The previous work on learning to play optimally usually does not explicitly take into account the computational efficiency of the learning algorithm, and often gives algorithms whose running time is exponential in some natural measure of the adversary's complexity; a notable recent exception is the work *Part of this research was conducted while visiting AT&T Bell Laboratones. Supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation, administered by the Israel Academy of Science and Humanities, and by a p n t of the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology. tPan of this research was conducted while at Hebrew University and while visiting AT&T Bell Laboratories. Supported by the Eshkol Fellowship, administered by the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology. Here we examine the problem of learning to play various games optimally against resource-bounded adversaries, with an explicit emphasis on the computational efficiency of the learning algorithm. We are especially interested in providing efficient algorithms for games other than penny-matching (in which payoff is received for matching the adversary's action in the current round), and for adversaries other than the classically studied finite automata. In particular, we examine games and adversaries for which the learning algorithm's past actions may strongly affect the adversary's future willingness to "cooperate" (that is, permit high payoff), and therefore require carefully planned actions on the part of the learning algorithm. For example, in the game we call contract, both sides play 0 or 1 on each round, but our side receives payoff only if we play 1 in synchrony with the adversary; unlike penny-matching, playing 0 in synchrony with the adversary pays nothing. The name of the game is derived from the example of signing a contract, which becomes valid only if both parties sign (play 1). In this game, it is not enough to simply predict the adversary's actions in order to play optimally; we must also discover how to massage the adversary into his most cooperative state, in which he is willing to play 1 frequently.
As an intuitive illustration of the difference between pennymatching and contract, consider playing these two games against the same finite automaton M . For playing pennymatching, we may not need to build a detailed model of M -as shown by Fortnow and Whang, it suffices to discover a "penny-matching cycle" of M [2] . For contract, while an exact model of M may still be unnecessary, we must do enough exploration to find any regions where M plays 1 frequently. A recurrent theme of the paper is the potential utility or danger of penny-matching (and more generally, of existing computational learning theory methods) as a tool for playing contract and other games.
We defer a detailed description of our results until the main body of the paper, after we have made the necessary definitions. Here we give a brief summary. The paper and the results are divided into two main parts. In Sections 3 and 4, we introduce two new classes of adversaries. The first adver-sary class is defined by simple boolean formulae that examine the recent history of play in order to determine their action in the current round. Adversaries in the second class base their current action on simple statistics of the entire history of play. For both classes of adversaries, we give polynomial-time algorithms for learning to play contract. In the second part of the paper in Section 5, we contribute to the literature on learning to play games against probabilistic finite automata. We give what is perhaps the most powerful positive result to date for learning to play games against automata -a polynomialtime algorithm for learning to play any game nearly optimally against any finite automaton with probabilistic actions and low cover time. If randomized transitions are allowed, we show that even approximating the optimal strategy against a given automaton is FSFACI-complete. This improves the result of Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis [7] .
Models and Definitions
In this paper, games are played by two players. One will be called the adversary and the other the strategy learning algorithm. We think of the adversary as a fixed resource-bounded computational mechanism that may be playing a strategy quite different from the minimax optimal strategy for the game. The strategy learning algorithm will be a polynomial-time algorithm attempting to learn, from repeated plays, a profitable strategy for playing against the adversary.
As is typical, a game in our setting can be defined by a payoff matrix G. Here we concentrate on games in which the actions of the two players and the outcome are binary, resulting in 2 x 2 matrices. In game theory such matrices usually have entries of the form (a, b) where a and b represent the respective payoffs made to the two players when the chosen row and column are played. Since the strategy of the adversary is now determined by a fixed computational device, and we are.interested only in the payoff made to the strategy learning algorithm, our matrices will indicate only that payoff. In a repeatedgame, play proceeds in rounds, with each player taking an action in each round, and the payoff to the strategy learning algorithm for that round being determined by the corresponding entry of the game matrix G. As we have indicated, in our model the adversary is chosen from a class A of restricted adversaries, usually defined by some resource-bounded computational device, such as finite automata, circuits of bounded size or depth, and so on. Both the strategy learning algorithm and the adversary can be regarded as (possibly probabilistic) mappings of game histories (that is, the actions made by the two players in all the rounds so far) to current actions. After N rounds, the payofs earned by a strategy g with respect to theadversary f is it is natural to allow L more computation to succeed against more complex adversaries. If L is a probabilistic algorithm then we require that it succeed only with probability 1 -S for a given confidence parameter S (and, as usual, allow it to run in time polynomial in log( 1 /a)). We will also have occasion to consider strategy learning algorithms L that can only achieve a payoff that is a multiplicative constant factor c < 1 of the optimal payoff; we call such algorithms c-competitive.
In the first part of the paper, we concentrate on two specific games. The first game, called penny-matching, gives payoff 1 to the strategy learning algorithm if and only its play matches that of the adversary -that is, if and only if both players play 0 or both players play 1. Otherwise, the payoff to the strategy learning algorithm is 0. Thus the game matrix is Go,o = GI,I = 1, GO,I = GI,O = 0. We will often use the term penny-matching to refer not only to this game itself, but also to the strategy (regardless of the game being played) of always playing the same action as the adversary. The second game we examine is called conhact. Here the strategy learning algorithm receives payoff 1 if and only if both players play 1 (sign the contract), otherwise it receives payoff 0. Thus the game matrix is GI,, = 1, Go,o = GO,^ = Gl,o = 0.
Despite the fact that the penny-matching and contract game matrices differ on only a single entry (when both players play 0), they capture a fundamental distinction between game types, especially in the context of resource-bounded adversaries. In penny-matching, regardless of the adversary's current action (which may depend strongly on the history of play), there is always some action that the strategy learning algorithm may take to achieve the maximum possible payoff in the entire matrix (namely, match the adversary's play). In contract, however, if the adversary is currently playing 0, there is no action the strategy learning algorithm may make in order to achieve nonzero N > No payoff. Thus, succeeding at penny-matching requires only that the strategy learning algorithm learn to predict the adversary's actions, while contract may require the strategy learning algorithm to injuence the adversary's actions, possibly through careful planning over many rounds of play.
Games Against Recent History Adversaries
Much of the previous work on playing games against computationally bounded adversaries has concentrated on finite automata adversaries, and there has been little work on learning to play optimally except for the game of penny-matching. In this section and the next, we investigate the problem of learning to play contract against two types of adversaries that are rather different from those defined by small automata. The first type of adversary is defined by certain boolean formulae over the recent history of play, and the second type of adversary is defined by linear functions of simple statistics of the entire history of play. In both cases, exponentially many states may be required to describe the same adversaries as finite automata. We begin by introducing the general framework of recent history adversaries, then specialize to the simple class that we can analyze.
Let us introduce the history vectors of length C at round N ( N 2 e), GN ,GN E (0, l}'. where the variable U," contains the binary value that was played by the strategy learning algorithm at round N -i, and the variable w," contains the binary value that was played by the adversary at round N -i
(1 <_ i <_ e). When the current round N is still smaller than the history length C, iiN and GN are defined to be the vectors of length N which contain the actions played by the strategy learning algorithm and the adversary, respectively, in the first N rounds. For simplicity, when no confusion will result we will drop the superscript N indicating the index of the current round. Thus U' and G simply store the last C rounds of play, and they are continually updated during play by shifting after each round (with the plays made . 4 + 1 rounds ago being lost).
A recent history adversary is an adversary whose current play is defined by some boolean function f(U',G). As a simple example, consider the adversary for contract defined by the boolean formula on the recent history adversary f . Not surprisingly, however, a number of the computational limitations governing more standard learning models translate to the current setting. For example, we should not expect to efficiently learn to play penny-matching against recent history adversaries that are boolean circuits (over the input variables U' and v", of size polynomial in the history length C, since such adversaries can compute pseudo-random functions of the history. (This claim will be made formally in the full paper). Similar arguments apply to learning to play contract.
On the positive side, suppose that the recent history adversary f(.',G) is drawn from a class d of boolean functions for which there is an absolute mistake-bounded algo- Then it is easy to see that A is in fact an algorithm that will efficiently learn to play penny-matching nearly optimally, because since m(Cl size( f)) does not depend on N , the fraction of rounds in which we have failed to match decreases at a rate of O( 1 / N ) . This logic fails for contract, however, where our goal is not simply that of prediction, but of maximizing the number of rounds where we play 1 in synchrony with the adversary. We now investigate further this apparent difference between penny-matching and contract for a particular class of recent history adversaries. Consider the class of recent history adversaries defined by the boolean formulae fs(U', G), where S G { 1, . . . ,C} is an index set, and
The restriction i 5 N in the subscript is clearly redundant for N 2 e, and is added only to ensure that fs be well defined on history vectors of length less than C. We adopt the convention that for every S , fs(X, A) = 1, where X denotes the empty history vector. We do this because if we allow fs(X, A) = 0, then fs will play 0 on all future rounds, and no strategy can achieve payoff higher than 0. Taken together, the restriction i 5 N in the subscript above and the condition fs(X, A) = 1 are equivalent to assuming that the history vectors are initialized to contain a single sacrifice in the most recent round, and all 0 entries for both players in the t! -1 previous rounds. Note that fs IS a 2-DNF formula over the variables U ] , . . . ,ut, V I , . . . ,we. Since such formulae have an efficient absolute mistake-bounded algorithm [Sj, our comments above imply that we can learn to play penny-matching nearly optimally against such adversaries in polynomial time. Let us now examine the more subtle problem of playing contract against this class. The term ( T U , A U,) stipulates that i rounds ago, the adversary fs played 1, but the strategy learning algorithm played 0. We call such a round a sacrijice, because since fs played 1, the strategy learning algorithm could have obtained a payoff by playing 1 but instead played a 0. If a sacrifice occurred i rounds ago for any a in the index set S , the adversary plays 1 in the current round; otherwise the adversary plays 0.
We call the set { fs} the past sacrifice adversaries for contract.
The past sacrifice adversaries are interesting for the direct tension they create between obtaining payoff in the current round, and ensuring future payoff, which requires the occasional insertion of sacrifices into the history. Even a player who knows fs and wishes to play contract optimally cannot pursue the greedy strategy of always playing 1 in synchrony with fsthe reader can easily verify that this would quickly drain the history vectors of any sacrifices they might have contained, and no further contract payoff would be possible.
Thus, while the fs are rather trivial adversaries for playing penny-matching, a different approach is required for playing contract against this same class. We now give an efficient strategy learning algorithm for playing contract against the past sacrifice adversaries that is 1 /2-competitive (that is, achieves payoff at least 1/2 times the optimal payoff). The analysis shows that the optimal payoff has an interesting numbertheoretic characterization.
Theorem 3.1
There is an efficient 1 /2-competitive strategy learning algorithm for playing contract against the class of past sacrifice strategies.
Proof (Sketch):
The proposed strategy learning algorithm L operates in two simple phases. In the first phase (called the sacrifice phase), L always plays 0 (regardless of the actions of fs) in order to "flood" the history vectors with as many sacrifices as possible. In the second phase (the payoffphase), L attempts to alternate periods of sacrifice with periods of payoff in a pattern that can be maintained indefinitely. We begin by giving a characterization of the rate at which sacrifices are obtained during the sacrifice phase of L. This rate also provides us with an upper bound on the optimal payoff. Lemma 3.2 Let fs be any past sacrijice adversary for contract, and consider the strategy that always plays 0 against f s.
Then after at most e3 rounds ofplay, sacrifices will occur every g rounds, where g = gcd( S ) is the greatest common divisor of the indices appearing in S. Furthermore, the optimal payoff that can be obtained against fs by any player is at most 1 /g.
For the upper bound on the optimal payoff, first consider any strategy R for playing against fs, and let us credit R with payoff 1 at the current round if fs plays 1, regardless of whether R has played 0 or 1. Then we will only overcount the actual payoff of R, and now we can assume without loss of generality that R plays to maximize the frequency with which fs plays 1. Since R's playing 1 in the current round can never cause fs to play 1 in a future round, O(Lemma 3.2) Thus, the sacrifice phase of our strategy learning algorithm L continues until the history vectors are g-8ooded with sacrifices -that is, until they contain a sacrifice every g indices. By Lemma 3.2, this occurs after at most e3 rounds. (Note that L can quickly infer the value of g from the pattern of sacrifices that emerges.) At this point, L attempts to enter its payoff phase. Since L's behavior on rounds that are not g-rounds is irrelevant, we concentrate on L's behavior on g-rounds. Of course, L cannot simply begin playing 1 indefinitely, since this would quickly drain the history vectors of all sacrifices, and no further payoff would be possible -a balance between payoff and preservation of sacrifices is required. To begin with, we dismiss the degenerate case in which the index set S contains only a single index il : it can be verified that in this case only a single payoff can ever be obtained, so the average payoff over time approaches 0. Thus without loss of generality 15' 1 2 2.
Suppose first that we knew the first two indices il , iz, and let i z -il = dg for a natural number d 2 1. Consider the strategy of restoring sacrifices for the next d g-rounds, then obtaining payoff for the following d g-rounds. We claim that this pattern can be maintained indefinitely, because at every ground either i l or 22 contains a past sacrifice, and thus fs will play 1. The reason is that a single payoff block of d g-rounds is too short to cover both il and 22, but these payoff blocks are too long for i l and i2 to be covered by different blocks of payoff.
It remains to find il and 22. This can be done on the first rounds of play (prior to the sacrifice phase) in the following simple manner. The strategy learning algorithm plays 1 until the adversary first plays 1 (in round i l ) and then switches to playing 0 until the adversary next plays 1 (at round
Games Against Statistical Adversaries
In this section we study the problem of playing contract against an adversary whose current move depends on the entire (unbounded) history of play so far (in contrast to the recent history adversaries of the last section), but only through the statistics of the history. playing contract contain penny-matching subroutines, and thus solve the penny-matching problem as well. The reason that penny-matching is a useful subroutine here is that for certain fa,p, penny-matching moves us on a trajectory through the 1 -p00 plane that rapidly approaches the optimal point, and remains there stably. Thus in these cases penny-matching can be thought of as an effective means of motion in the PI 1 -p00 plane. 
Theorem4.1 For any

Proof (Sketch):
We restrict our attention to the case a > 0, which is the most interesting, and for which a representative picture is shown in Figure 1 . The general a case will be considered in the full paper; the ideas are quite similar but some care is required in the handling of initial conditions.
The main points of the proof are: (1 j For a > 0 (implying that the linear separator has positive slope in the p~l -poo plane) the strategy of penny-matching (that is, always playing identically to the adversary fa,pj is in fact an optimal contract strategy 2 ; (2) Despite the fact that the well-known halving algorithm can be forced to make many prediction mistakes on an arbitrary sequence of trials, on the sequence actually generated by the halving algorithm playing contract against fa,o, only a logarithmic number of mistakes will be made;
and (3) The logarithmic number of prediction mistakes have a small effect on the contract payoff. We assume in the following analysis that the initial conditions are poo = pl1 = 0. Other initial conditions can be treated similarly. We begin by considering the payoff obtained when the halving algorithm plays contract against a simple onedimensional adversary fe(p11), where fs(pl ]) = 1 if and only if pll < 8. The reader can easily verify that against such an adversary, the optimal contract payoff at round N is within 1 / N of 8, and that this optimum can be achieved by always playing 1, but also by (perfectly) penny-matching against f e . Here we are interested in analyzing the contract payoff of the one-dimensional halving algorithm LI , since this analysis will include many of the elements required to solve the two-dimensional case. In the usual models of on-line prediction [5], the sequence of inputs 2, to f e to be classified (that is, penny-matched) is arbitrary, and the halving algorithm may be forced to make N prediction mistakes in N trials due to the arbitrary precision of the 2% (an unfavorable sequence would always arrange the next 2, to fall in the current version space). To see that the present situation is considerably more favorable, we make the following definition: p E [0, I] has rational complexity at most N if p is a rational number whose numerator and denominator are both at most N. Then at every round N , 8 L and 8, have rational complexity at most N , since they represent frequencies of certain events over at most N rounds of play. It is easy to verify that this implies -t9L > 1 / N 2 .
Thus if m is the number of prediction mistakes made by L1
on the first N rounds, we must have 1/2" > 1/N2, or m < 2 log N . We now argue that these few prediction mistakes made by L1 have a rather small effect on the contract payoff that L1 receives in comparison to perfect penny-matching, which is an optimal contract strategy. again, and for all rounds in between N and 2N, PII is at least 8 -E . We know that between rounds N and 2N, L I will make at most 2 log(2N) prediction mistakes, and that each such mistake decreases pI1 by at most 1/N. Thus the total decrease to pll between rounds N and 2 N is at most 2log(2N)/N. On the other hand, as long Armed with the analysis of algorithm L I , we can now retum to the two-dimensional adversary fa,p(pm, PI]). In this case, the optimal contract payoff is the largest value p E IO, 11 such that fa,p(l -p , p ) = 1. In other words, an optimal contract strategy tries to maintain poo = 1 -p and pl I = p for p as large as possible; see Figure 1 . The reader may verify that penny-matching against fa,p will again achieve this optimum (see Figure 1 for a typical trajectory taken by penny-matching), and also that the naive strategy of always playing 1 (which did achieves the optimum against the one-dimensional fe) will not succeed.
Thus, our goal will again be that of approximately pennymatching, this time using the two-dimensional halving algorithm L2 for the fa,p. The version space is now more complicated than in the one-dimensional case, as is the analysis bounding the number of prediction mistakes made by L2. However, the basic proof outline is similar. It can be shown that the version space, which is the region in the Q -,6 plane consistent with the history so far, is always a convex polygon. is approximately penny-matching within a narrow ribbon of the line p00 + p11 = 1, which includes the optimal configuration. An analysis similar to that given in Lemma 4.2 shows that Lz will converge rapidly to this optimal configuration. Cl(Theorem 4.1) We conclude this section by considering the more complicated case in which the adversary's 1 -region is an intersection of d half-spaces, rather than just a single half-space. We seek a strategy learning algorithm that is polynomial in d. We again assume that all of the half-spaces are defined by lines with positive slope in the p1 Iplane; a representative adversary is shown in Figure 2 . 
Proof (Sketch):
Let f be the adversary function. Again it is easily verified that in the case of positive slopes, the optimal configuration is the dividing point between the 0 and 1 regions on the line poo + plt = 1, and that penny-matching will rapidly converge to this optimum. However, now the version space has 2d parameters and the volume computation required for directly implementing the halving algorithm has no known polynomial time solution (in particular, since histories for which the adversary plays 0 result in a disjunction of linear constraints on the 2d parameters, the version space is no longer necessarily a convex body). Our algorithm will still attempt to penny-match, but using a different strategy. these two new subintervals using the past examples that fall into each subinterval. For at least one of the new subintervals, the local version space must be non-empty, since only the subinterval containing the last example can have an empty local version space (recall that prior to the last example, the entire subinterval [a, b) had a non-empty local version space, so any subinterval has a non-empty local version space if the last example is omitted). As long as a new subinterval has an empty local version space, we divide it again. However, since newly created subintervals that do not contain the last example and are adjacent can be merged together again to get a larger subinterval with a non-empty local version space, in the worst case we divide [a, b ) into three new subintervals  [a, e), [c, d ) , [d, b) , each with non-empty local version spaces.
The main point is that each time a local version space becomes empty, we create at most three new subintervals, while reducing our uncertainty about the location of a comer off by at least 1 /2 (since there must have been acomer in [a, b) if its local version space became empty, and now this comer lies in a subinterval of length at most ( b -a)/2). Furthermore, since the values of poo and pl1 have low rational complexity, the subintervals always have length at least 1 / N 2 at round N .
This allows us to guarantee that there are at most O(d log N ) prediction mistakes caused by empty local version spaces. In each subinterval we make at most 2 log N prediction mistakes, so the total number of mistakes is bounded by O(dlog2 N ) . This can be shown to imply that the algorithm will rapidly reach the optimal point in the pl1 -poo plane for playing contract against f.
O(Theorem 4.3)
Games Against Probabilistic Automata
We now turn to the problem of playing games against adversaries defined by probabilistic Jinite automata. This continues a line of research investigated by Gilboa and Samet [3] , and more recently by Fortnow and Whang [2] and Vovk [12] . Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for learning to play any game nearly optimally against any finite automaton with probabilistic states (defined below) and small cover time. We also prove that if the adversary automaton has probabilistic transitions (defined below) then even the problem of approximating the optimal payoff when the automaton is given to the algorithm is ?SPACE-complete (improving on a result of Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis [7] ), which precludes a positive result for learning to play optimally against such machines.
Probabilistic State Automata
A probabilistic state automaton (PSA) can be thought of as a generalization of a DFA in which each state contains a different biased coin (with the usual definition of a DFA being obtained by restricting all the biases to be either 0 or 1). In state q, the PSA generates a single output bit (action) by flipping the biased coin at q. As in a DFA, the next state is still determined solely by the next input bit (action).
More 7(q, b) . Thus, the strategy learning algorithm observes the outcome of the adversary's biased coin flip for the current round only afer choosing its own action for the current round. Note that the outcome of the biased coin flip is the only information the strategy learning algorithm receives about the current state; this is in contrast to much of the research on Markov decision processes, where the learning algorithm is told the identity of the current state.
Notice that although PSA's flip coins at each state, the fact that their transitions remain deterministic preserves the usual notion of cycles -namely, a state q and a sequence of actions (of the strategy learning algorithm) from q that returns to q. As in the case of DFA's, for every PSA there exists an optimal strategy that is a repeated simple cycle [3] . Moreover, if the automaton is given, the optimal cycle can be found efficiently using dynamic programming. Gilboa and Samet [3] note that their algorithm for learning an optimal cycle strategy against DFA's can be easily adapted to PSA's. However, as in their original strategy for DFA's, it may take an exponential number of rounds (exponential in the number of states of the adversary PSA) to achieve payoff which is close to optimal. Fortnow and Whang [2] showed that in the case of DFA's, if the underlying game played has a certain property (held by contract but not by penny-matching), then there is also an exponential lower bound for the number of rounds needed before approaching optimality.
It is interesting to note that if the underlying game is penny-matching then the exponential lower bound does not hold. Fortnow and Whang give an efficient strategy learning algorithm for playing penny-matching against DFA's. Unfortunately, it does not seem that penny-matching is any easier than contract when playing against PSA's. The "combination lock" lower bound argument given by Fortnow and Whang for contract can easily be modified to give an exponential lower bound for learning to play penny-matching against PSA's. The important property of combination lock automata is the existence of a state which can be reached only when the strategy learning algorithm plays a specific sequence of n -1 actions. For this remote state, there exists an action which achieves high expected payoff, and which allows the algorithm to remain in the same state. For every other state, the expected payoff is low no matter what action is chosen by the learning algorithm. A natural question is whether we can obtain efficient algorithms when we restrict our attention to automata that do not have states that are hard to reach -that is, automata whose underlying graphs have small (polynomial) cover time3 We answer this question in the affirmative in the theorem below. Our result improves on the work of Ron and Rubinfeld[lO] , who examine the special case of state bias functions that take only two possible values 7) and 1 -q for 0 5 7) 5 1. it is similar to standard models of automaton learning in its construction of a complete model of M , and does not explicitly account for the fact that the goal is to play a game against M . However, if we play against M according to an optimal cycle computed for M , then our payoff will be close to optimal. It should be noted that the quality of approximation needed may depend on the game G being played -for instance, if some entry of the game matrix is much larger than the other entries, then high expected payoff may be achieved by hitting this entry only very rarely, in which case we will need better approximations of the state coin biases. For simplicity in the description below, we will assume the game matrix has only entries from (0, l}.
In order to simplify the presentation we start by making two assumptions; the first can be made without loss of generality, and the second can be removed using a technique due to Ron and Rubinfeldll 11. Assumption (1): A4 is irreducible in the sense that there is no smaller automaton equivalent to it. Assumption (2): There exists some value A = poly(c/n) such that for every state q in the adversary automaton M , the state coin bias y(q) satisfies y(q) = kA for some integer IC. Thus, any pair of states may contain coins with either the same bias or significantly different biases.
The standard problem that arises when trying to learn automata of various types from a single continuous sequence of actions is the need for a procedure that orients the learner by providing evidence that it has returned to a state it has previously visited. In fact, it is possible to show [IO] that in the case of small cover time, the PSA learning problem reduces to the problem of orientation (details omitted), and thus we concentrate on this latter problem. A well-studied procedure for orientation when learning DFA's uses homing sequences [9] .
A homing sequence for a DFA is an action sequence h such that regardless of the starting state, the sequence of state labels observed during the execution of h uniquely determines the state reached.
The problem that arises when trying to adapt the notion of a homing sequence to a PSA M is that now the state labels (adversary actions) observed are no longer deterministic, but are generated by biased coin flips. Hence, given any action sequence h and state q of M , there is not a unique sequence of actions played by M when h is executed starting from q, but rather there is a distribution on such sequences. In order to overcome this obstacle we first modify the definition of a homing sequence as if we were actually able to see the bias of the coin in each state as we passed through it. We say that a sequence h = hl . . . , h l ) But we know that for the minimal period 7r,
M $ T i ' ,
where $"?' is a good approximation of qs(a). The above discussion gives us a simple procedure for computing a good approximation of qs(llt), from which we can derive with high probability the exact sequence of corresponding probabilities under Assumption (2) . O(Theorem 5.1)
Probabilistic Transition Automata
In this section we give a hardness results for the problem of playing games against Probabilistic Transition Automata (PTA's). In these automata, the state transition function is probabilistic, and thus the path taken through the automaton in response to a sequence of strategy learning algorithm actions is randomly distributed. is 1 with probability y(q), and 0 with probability 1 -y(q).
If the action of the strategy learning algorithm at round N is b E (0, l} then the next state is chosen randomly according to the probability distribution defined by T ( q , b, .). As before we let n = ]&I. It is worth noting that every automaton which has both probabilistic transitions and probabilistic actions can be transformed into an automaton of approximately the same size which has only probabilistic transitions. Fortnow and Whang [2] show that there exist PTA's for which there is no optimal strategy, even for penny-matching (where a strategy g is optimal with respect to an adversary f if lim infiv-,oo PAYOFFfN(g) is maximized). Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis [7] show that computing the exact payoff of the optimal strategy (given that it exists) is PSPdC&-complete. Unfortunately, this result is not sufficient to dismiss the possibility of an efficient strategy learning algorithm, because such an algorithm must only discover an approximately optimal strategy. In the following theorem we claim that even approximating the optimal payoff for N = poZy(n) rounds within Q( 1 /fi) is PSPdC&-complete. As in the work of Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis [7] , we assume the automaton is given as input to the algorithm. Clearly, if the automaton is not given (as in the learning setting), the problem of learning an approximately optimal strategy is at least as hard. We say a game is trivial G if all the entries in its game matrix have the same value.
The proof of the theorem, which is ommited for lack of space, is based on a reduction from Arthur-Merlin games. The size of the automaton in the reduction is proportional to the number of bits sent between Arthur and Merlin. This raises the question of whether we can do better for small PTA's -namely, whether a good strategy can be found in time exponential in the size of the automaton but polynomial in 1 / E . We show in the full version of the paper that, given an automata, if the game is played for N rounds then such a strategy can be found efficiently (where the dependence of the running time on N is linear).
